Opinion/Feature
NNPC Vs Dangote – Where The Truth Lies
By Azu Ishiekwene
“The whole show leaves a bitter, corrosive aftertaste of sulfurous proportions. Dangote has been accused of many things.”
Africa’s richest man, Aliko Dangote, is not a stranger to adversity or its more sinister cousin, sabotage.
One of the bitterest battles he has fought in the last 25 years—the cement war — was against his kinsman and founder of BUA Group, Abdulsamad Rabiu. Folks close to both men have tried to patch them up, but the embers are still smouldering.
Dangote’s face-off with the Kogi State government under former Governor Yahaya Bello over rights and royalties from Dangote Cement, Obajana, for the local community, was a skirmish compared to the cement war with Rabiu.
Wealth and comfort can be strange bedfellows, often mutually exclusive in the quest to conquer one mountain after the other. Dangote knows this only too well. And nowhere has the lesson been more evident than his pursuit to own a refinery.
Just like that?
I told this story before in an article in May 2023. In the twilight of the ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo administration, the government sold off two of Nigeria’s moribund refineries — Port Harcourt and Kaduna — to Blue Star, a Dangote-led consortium. Blue Star paid $670 million for the plants and walked away, thinking the deal was done. It wasn’t.
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In 2007, the government of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua capitulated. It refunded Dangote under pressure from labour unions and vested interests in the refineries on the excuse that the assets were “national patrimony” that should not be sold, “just like that!” It didn’t matter that at the time of sale, both refineries produced less than 20 per cent of capacity without hope or promise of improvement.
Dangote took his money and walked away, bruised but unbowed. Six years later, he announced plans to build a private refinery, first in Ogun state, and later, he moved it to Lagos with a capacity of 650,000 bpd—over 200,000 more than the installed capacity of Nigeria’s four refineries combined.
Single train revenge
Dangote’s single-train refinery, originally estimated to cost $12 billion but finished at around $20 billion, is now at the centre of another storm. It’s not about International Oil Companies (IOCs) he accused of trying to undermine him. It’s the more deadly variety of wars: the one from within.
The regulators, particularly the head of the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA), Farouk Ahmed, said in a television interview in the State House with the NNPC Group CEO, Mele Kyari, present, that Dangote Refinery was making products with unsafe Sulphur levels, and also trying to monopolise the industry.
Ahmed can raise valid safety concerns as a regulator and call out a monopoly. The Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) provides safety standards and a price reflexive framework to prevent a monopoly. Under the Act, the regulator is empowered to act in the interest of consumers and fair play.
Sulfurous things and backstory
Ahmed didn’t say precisely what the tolerable sulphur level was or provide evidence that Dangote was trying to become a monopoly. Instead, he contradicted himself by mentioning at least two other refineries, Waltersmith and Aradel, operating at different capacities. If this were a chat in a beer parlour, it would be pardonable.
But to think that the head of a regulatory agency will level an accusation of unsafe sulphur levels and offer no response when he was told that neither his agency nor the NNPC had a laboratory is scary. I’m not sure why Kyari stood beside him, grinning. Or why the State House posted the video on its official handle.
But the whole show leaves a bitter, corrosive aftertaste of sulfurous proportions.
Dangote has been accused of many things. He has been accused of feeding off government indulgences, from waivers to tax breaks and preferential forex allocations, even though he was not the only beneficiary. Even the 20 per cent stake in the Dangote Refinery, which we are now told the government paid only 7.2 per cent, left many questions about that transaction needing to be answered.
On another front, some have accused Dangote of hedging his bet poorly in the 2023 election that brought President Bola Ahmed Tinubu to power, unlike his adversary, Rabiu, who appears to have hit the bull’s eye.
Unkindest cut
But none of these charges is as unkind as those of Ahmed, who, if shame still means anything, should not have uttered the first letter of the ‘s-word’, never mind the phrase “sulphur levels.” I’m not sure he can find his way to a viable lab owned by NMDPRA or NNPC because there isn’t one. The regulators rely on third-party labs in Lagos, such as GMO, Sewort, SGS, and others, to vet its imported petroleum products.
Yet, Ahmed chooses to publicly discredit, without proof, products that we are told have been repeatedly ordered by TotalEnergies and BP, among others.
In response to a question from a LEADERSHIP reporter on Tuesday about whether NNPC has a lab, the corporation said, “NNPC conducts rigorous testing on all its products to ensure they meet global safety and quality standards,” adding that NMDPRA can provide verified data through regular official reports. What does that mean in English?
A regulator’s record
And Kyari seemed pleased with this scandalous drama even though NNPC, which he superintends, has spent about $25 billion in turnaround maintenance of moribund refineries in the last 25 years, plus the recent $1.5 billion spent on his watch for more turnaround. One of the subsidiaries, PHRC, employed 487 new staff four years ago and paid N23 billion in salaries without producing one litre of petrol.
All that consumers are asking for, after losing a significant part of the battle for price, is the availability of petroleum products. God knows what they are getting under the current monopolistic system, which permits NNPC to play around with import licences, are long queues, contaminated products, and a regulator mockingly claiming to be a public company.
Suppose Dangote Refinery is in breach of any regulations; what steps have the regulators taken to call the refinery to order or help them overcome, except if they claim there was evidence of a malicious default? Our officials spend hundreds of thousands of dollars touring the world for foreign investors only to chew local investors with a microphone in a fit of what? Rage, sabotage, indiscretion or stupidity?
Feuding parties
The closed-door meeting among the feuding parties, which Tinubu ordered on Monday, may keep them on a leash for a while, but it hardly addresses the underlying issues. If products from the Dangote Refinery currently exceed the sulphur levels — as Dangote had also said on a different occasion — why can’t the regulator work with the refinery to fix it without a scandalous press conference?
And is the talk about monopoly a fear-induced trope? How can Ahmed even speak of a monopoly when supply is hardly available, and the current distortionist-in-chief is NNPC, the sole importer of petrol and sole awarder of import licences for diesel?
It doesn’t smell good. Dangote Refinery is only 45 per cent complete — the entire plant? Yet, Kyari and Ahmed joined former President Muhammadu Buhari in inaugurating the plant last year? Seriously?
After years of working with petrol importers in his former life as the chief executive of PPMC, Ahmed is struggling with his new role as a regulator. He deserves public sympathy and can get it without being a retailer of beer parlour gossip or a bagman for vested interests.
Ishiekwene is Editor-in-Chief of LEADERSHIP and author of the new book Writing for Media and Monetising It
Opinion/Feature
Unlocking NPFL’s Market Value, Potential (1)
By Andrew Ekejiuba
The Nigeria Premier Football League (NPFL) possesses all the ingredients required to become one of Africa’s most valuable domestic football competitions.
With a population exceeding 230 million people, an enormous football-loving fan base, fierce regional rivalries, an abundance of talented players, and a rapidly expanding digital audience, Nigeria has a foundation that many leagues across the continent can only aspire to.
Yet, despite these enormous advantages, the commercial value of the country’s elite league remains far below its true potential.
Unlocking this value requires a fundamental shift in how NPFL clubs are managed. Clubs must stop operating merely as football teams and begin functioning as professional sports businesses. Unfortunately, many NPFL clubs continue to run as extensions of government ministries rather than commercially driven organizations. This governance model has significantly hindered both the growth of the clubs and the development of the league itself.
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Every NPFL club should have a Board with competent professionals overseeing strategic decisions and policies. Equally important is the appointment of qualified Chief Executive Officers, Commercial Directors, Marketing Managers, Digital Media Teams, Fan Engagement Officers, and Business Development Executives.
All these are necessary because sustainable football success is built on strong institutions, not merely on performances on the pitch.
It has been revealed that most government-owned NPFL clubs rely almost entirely on state government funding despite the potential to generate incremental revenues annually. This dependency creates numerous challenges, including unstable financing, political interference, weak accountability, and little motivation to generate independent revenue. Such a structure inevitably limits innovation and commercial growth.
To become financially sustainable, clubs must progressively diversify their revenue streams through sponsorships, merchandising, hospitality services, membership programmes, ticket sales, academy transfers, digital subscriptions, media content, and other commercial initiatives. All these can be achieved through verifiable metrics and analytics that are attractive to various local and international partners. Government ownership, where it exists, should target direct intervention in key strategic areas and create a conducive environment that will facilitate the accelerated growth and development of the Clubs.
Another significant opportunity lies in building stronger club brands.
Although many NPFL clubs boast rich histories and passionate supporters, their brand identities remain underdeveloped. Every club should possess a clearly recognizable identity defined by its colours, logo, slogan, traditions, legends, and deep community roots.
Successful football clubs across the world sell identity before they sell football. Supporters do not merely buy tickets—they buy belongings. Consequently, every NPFL club should invest in a consistent visual identity, professionally managed websites, vibrant social media platforms, documentaries, podcasts, player profiles, and well-preserved historical archives. Football fans connect with stories just as much as they celebrate trophies.
Equally important is improving the matchday experience. Many NPFL venues still struggle with poor seating arrangements, inadequate parking facilities, poor sanitation, limited food and beverage options, weak security, and insufficient entertainment before and after matches. A football match should be an event that supporters eagerly anticipate, not simply ninety minutes of action. Creating enjoyable and memorable matchday experiences will strengthen emotional attachment between clubs and their supporters while increasing attendance and spending.
Digital media also presents one of the greatest opportunities for unlocking the league’s commercial value. Today’s football audience increasingly consumes content on mobile phones and digital platforms long before watching matches on television. Consequently, clubs must invest heavily in digital content creation.
Media departments should consistently produce engaging content, including training sessions, behind-the-scenes footage, player interviews, tactical analysis, academy updates, fan competitions, historical features, documentaries, and interactive social media campaigns. Around the world, digital engagement has become a significant source of commercial revenue through advertising, sponsorships, subscriptions, and fan monetization. The NPFL cannot afford to be left behind.
Another area requiring strategic attention is player development and transfers. Evidence from several emerging football leagues shows that player trading can become a major source of sustainable income when properly managed. Nigeria continues to produce exceptional football talent, yet too many players leave for relatively insignificant transfer fees.
NPFL clubs should strengthen their youth academies, offer longer-term contracts to promising players, improve scouting networks, negotiate favourable sell-on clauses, secure development compensation rights, and create attractive welfare packages to retain outstanding talent for longer periods. European clubs such as Red Bull Salzburg and Genk have built highly successful business models around player development and strategic transfers, an approach worthy of emulation.
In addition, club licensing regulations should enforce the requirement for every NPFL club to own and operate a functional youth academy that consistently feeds the first team. Such academies reduce recruitment costs, reinforce club identity, generate future transfer income, and strengthen community engagement. Beyond football, these academies should prioritize education, nutrition, sports science, psychology, and life-skills training to ensure the holistic development of young athletes.
Finally, clubs must begin to view their stadiums as commercial assets capable of generating revenue year-round, not merely on matchdays. Properly managed stadiums can host concerts, conferences, exhibitions, restaurants, museums, gyms, club shops, guided tours, and corporate events while also generating income through naming rights and other commercial partnerships.
In part two of this series, attention will shift to other critical drivers of football economics, including improved officiating standards, broadcasting rights, sponsorship development, data analytics, fan engagement strategies, and governance reforms.
Ultimately, the NPFL’s greatest untapped asset is not merely the quality of football played on the pitch. A vast domestic market, an intensely passionate football culture, a large diaspora community, and an endless pipeline of talented players provide a foundation that very few African leagues can match. If these assets are strategically harnessed, the NPFL can emerge as one of the continent’s most commercially successful and globally respected football leagues.
Ekejiuba of GTI, writes from Lagos Island
Opinion/Feature
AKK: NNPC’s Continued Drive for Nigeria’s Development
By Adeyemi Ilori
I have followed Nigeria’s gas story for the better part of two decades. I have sat through presentations that promised the world and delivered little. I have seen feasibility studies gather dust while flares continued to burn across the Niger Delta.
So, when I say that something feels different this time, I want you to understand the weight of that admission.
For years, the conventional wisdom among energy analysts was that NNPC was a black box – opaque, slow, and better at consuming budgets than delivering pipelines. But the evidence accumulating over the past eighteen months, particularly under the current Ojulari leadership at NNPC, suggests that the corporation is finally translating its gas into tangible infrastructure. The AKK pipeline, the OB3 interconnector, and the relaunched Gas Master Plan 2026 are not just slide-deck fantasies. They are, against considerable odds, becoming physical realities.
Let me be clear: this is not an uncritical endorsement. There are still legitimate questions about cost overruns, contracting transparency, and the long-term commercial viability of some projects. But the direction of travel is unmistakable. Nigeria is moving from a flare-heavy crude economy to a gas-industrialised powerhouse. And NNPC, for all its historical baggage, is the engine of that transition.
Any credible analysis of NNPC’s gas ambitions must start with the Nigeria LNG story. Not because it is new, but because it remains the single most successful energy partnership in sub-Saharan Africa. The experiment began in 1995 with a final investment decision. Four years later, the first cargo left Bonny Island for France. That is a turnaround time that would impress any international project manager.
As the majority shareholder with 49 per cent equity, NNPC’s role, among others, was to secure gas supply through its joint venture partners, most of whom were also shareholders. The structure was complex, but it worked. NLNG has since generated over $114bn in revenue for Nigeria and dramatically reduced gas flaring. Train 7, approved in 2019, will increase capacity by another third.
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But here is the critical observation that many inside Nigeria miss: NLNG succeeded partly because it was insulated from day-to-day political interference. It had a dedicated special-purpose vehicle, world-class partners (Shell, Total, Eni), and a clear export mandate. The question has always been whether NNPC could replicate that discipline for domestic gas infrastructure, where profit margins are thinner and political pressures are heavier. That question is now being answered.
Let me give credit where it is due. The Escravos-Lagos Pipeline System, commissioned in the same year as NLNG’s incorporation, does not get the attention it deserves. It moves gas from the Niger Delta to the industrial corridors of Lagos, Ogun and Oyo. Most of the power plants in that zone run on ELPS gas. If you have ever wondered why Lagos State’s economy dwarfs that of other Nigerian states, a reliable gas supply is a significant part of the answer.
But a critical observer would also note that ELPS is now decades old and operating below optimal capacity due to maintenance backlogs and third-party vandalism. The lesson is that building pipelines is only half the battle. Operating and protecting them is the long game. NNPC has made progress on security architecture – surveillance contracts, community engagement – but the threat landscape remains challenging. Rather than cower, NNPC’s scope has grown by leaps and bounds.
The Ajaokuta-Kaduna-Kano pipeline is the most ambitious inland gas project in Africa. Flagged off in 2020 under President Buhari, it spans 614 kilometres and costs roughly $2.8bn. When fully operational, it will transport 2.2 billion scf per day, support three new independent power plants in Abuja, Kaduna and Kano, and serve as the first leg of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline toward Europe.
Now, for the critical part: I have watched enough infrastructure projects in emerging markets to know that ribbon-cutting ceremonies are cheap. What matters is crossing the River Niger, physically and metaphorically. True to type, in July 2025, the Ojulari administration celebrated exactly that engineering feat. The project team managed to lay pipe across one of Africa’s most challenging waterways. That is not a small feat.
Since then, momentum has increased. First gas is expected to reach Abuja in a matter of months. If that happens on schedule, it will be a watershed moment. But I would caution that the AKK has already faced delays and cost escalations. The original completion timeline was optimistic. The current management seems to have learned from that – they are now under-promising and over-delivering, which is refreshing.
The real test will be whether the industrial revival in Kano and Kaduna follows the pipeline. Textile mills and manufacturing hubs will not spring back to life automatically. They need complementary policies – tariff reform, export incentives, and reliable electricity distribution. NNPC can bring gas to the gate. It cannot force factory owners to turn on their machines. Yet, NNPC seems undeterred.
If there is a case study in Nigerian project perseverance, it will be the Obiafu-Obrikom-Oben (OB3) pipeline. Construction began in 2013. It was not meant to take this long to complete. I have written reports predicting its completion every two years since 2016. I was wrong every time, but the horizon is promising now.
The terrain was unforgiving. Swamps, rivers, community disputes, and funding gaps.
But NNPC, under the current leadership, finally deployed specialised micro-tunnelling equipment to breach the last major obstacle. As of February 2026, the OB3 is flowing approximately 300 million scf per day. That is real gas, moving from the stranded Eastern fields to the industrial West.
I want to highlight something that warms an analyst’s heart: the project is being handled by a local contractor, Oilserv. That is a testament to deepening local content. But it also raises a legitimate question about oversight. Local contractors bring lower costs and faster mobilisation, but they also require rigorous quality assurance. So far, Oilserv appears to have delivered. I would like to see independent audits published – transparency breeds confidence. And if the thoughtfulness in aggregating gas supply and delivery is any indication, the omens are very encouraging.
The crown jewel, in my view, is the NNPC Gas Master Plan 2026, relaunched with additional partners under the Ojulari management. That is not another glossy brochure; it is a coherent framework connecting AKK, OB3, ELPS, and future projects into a single national grid. Think of it as the operating system for Nigeria’s gas economy.
Previous master plans failed because they were aspirational but not sequenced. This one prioritises: it focuses on power generation first (the largest demand centre), then industrial feedstock (fertiliser, methanol, petrochemicals), then compressed natural gas for transportation and liquefied petroleum gas for cooking. That is logical.
But here is my main reservation: the master plan relies heavily on continued international partnership and financing. The Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline to Europe is a multi-billion-dollar project that requires alignment with Algeria and Niger, both of whom have their own priorities. And European gas demand, post-2022, is less predictable than it once was, although the recent Middle East crisis appears to herald a silver lining for Africa-leaning investments. Despite that, Nigeria should not bet the house on exports only. Domestic industrialisation is the safer, more transformative bet.
So where does that leave an analyst like yours truly? I am overwhelmingly supportive of the direction, but I am not naive about the distance still to travel.
The positives: AKK is crossing rivers. OB3 is flowing. The Master Plan is coherent. NLNG’s success proves the model. ELPS shows what is possible. Ojulari’s first year has delivered more on-the-ground progress than recent years. Gas flaring is declining. Local content is deepening.
The critiques: Costs need to be more transparent. Project timelines have historically been fiction. Security of pipelines is an ongoing vulnerability. And gas alone cannot fix Nigeria’s broken electricity distribution network – that requires state-level reforms and private sector participation that lie outside NNPC’s mandate.
Let me end where I began. I have watched Nigeria’s energy sector for a long time. I have seen grand plans evaporate. The current moment feels different. Not because the challenges have disappeared: they haven’t. But because the leadership is finally treating gas infrastructure as a war, not a workshop. Pipelines are being laid. Rivers are being crossed. Molecules are moving.
AKK is coming. And for about the first time in years, I believe it.
Ilori is an energy analyst
Opinion/Feature
Inside Ojulari’s One-year Drive to Reengineer NNPC
In today’s high-stakes corporate and public sector leadership, performance is no longer judged by promises but by proof. Results must be tracked, decisions interrogated, and progress clearly demonstrated.
One year after Bayo Ojulari assumed office as Group Chief Executive Officer of NNPC Limited, the moment calls for a clear-eyed assessment of his leadership, what has changed, what has worked and what lies ahead.
Ojulari did not arrive at a moment of calm. His appointment on April 2, 2025, came against the backdrop of mounting public skepticism and internal contradictions. The state of Nigeria’s refineries, particularly those in Port Harcourt and Warri, had become a lightning rod for debate.
Officially, they had been recommissioned after years of costly rehabilitation. Unofficially, many doubted whether those facilities were genuinely functional.
The gap between declaration and reality had become too wide to ignore, feeding a broader crisis of credibility around the national oil company. It was into this uncertainty that Ojulari stepped, confronted with a choice that often defines leadership: preserve appearances or pursue the truth.
He chose the latter, and in doing so, reset the tone of governance at NNPC. Rather than defend inherited claims, he immersed himself in the mechanics of the system, reviewing technical reports, engaging operational teams, and interrogating data. What followed was a decision as simple as it was profound: shut down the refineries. It was not the kind of move that courts applause in the short term. It disrupted narratives, unsettled expectations, and exposed uncomfortable realities. But it also sent a clear message that the era of managed optics was over. If the refineries were to work, they would work properly; if they were not, they would not be dressed up to appear otherwise. In that moment, Ojulari signaled that under his watch, transparency would not be a slogan but a practice.
That signal quickly found expression in institutional behaviour. One of his earliest moves was to restore the publication of NNPC’s monthly financial and operations reports, a transparency mechanism that had fallen into inconsistency. With their return came a renewed ability for stakeholders to track the company’s performance, production volumes, revenues, operational efficiencies, without relying on speculation. The culture of disclosure deepened further in November 2025, when NNPC Limited held its first-ever earnings call following the release of its audited 2024 financial statements. The announcement of a N5.4 trillion profit after tax captured headlines, but beyond the numbers lay a more consequential shift: the company was beginning to speak the language of accountability expected of global energy players.
Still, leadership is not measured by transparency alone. It must be weighed against clearly defined objectives, and in Ojulari’s case, those objectives were set by Bola Ahmed Tinubu with unmistakable clarity. The mandate was ambitious, raise crude oil production to two million barrels per day by 2027, scale gas output to eight billion cubic feet per day within the same timeframe, expand refining capacity, and attract tens of billions of dollars in fresh investment. It was a tall order by any standard, particularly in a sector long burdened by structural inefficiencies and external pressures.
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One year on, the evidence suggests that while the journey is far from complete, the direction has shifted. In upstream operations, Ojulari has overseen a notable increase in production through NNPC Exploration & Production Ltd. Output climbed from a daily average of 203,000 barrels in 2023 to 312,000 barrels by December 2025, with peaks reaching 355,000 barrels, the highest level recorded in decades. National production has also edged upward, moving from roughly 1.5 million barrels per day to about 1.62 million. To the uninitiated, the increment may appear modest, but within the context of Nigeria’s oil sector, where theft, vandalism, and operational disruptions have long suppressed output, it represents meaningful progress. Each additional barrel reflects not just production capacity but improved system integrity.
If oil production tells a story of recovery, gas tells one of momentum. Developments within the NNPC/Renaissance joint venture have positioned gas as a central pillar of growth, with output already hitting 2.2 billion cubic feet per day. The optimism surrounding this trajectory is not speculative. As Tony Attah of Renaissance Africa Energy Company noted, the venture has surpassed its immediate targets and is already recalibrating towards higher benchmarks. This growth is being reinforced by critical infrastructure projects.
The River Niger crossing of the Ajaokuta-Kaduna-Kano pipeline has brought long-awaited clarity to a project that had lingered in uncertainty, while the Obiafu-Obrikom-Oben pipeline is nearing completion. Together, they represent more than engineering milestones, they are the arteries through which Nigeria’s gas ambitions can flow into industrial reality.
Yet, it is in refining that Ojulari’s leadership has been most paradoxical. On paper, little progress has been made toward expanding capacity. In practice, however, his decision to shut down the refineries may prove to be one of the most consequential moves of his tenure. By refusing to perpetuate underperformance, he has created space for a more credible and sustainable approach to refining. It is a strategy that sacrifices immediacy for integrity, choosing to rebuild rather than patch.
Investment, meanwhile, has emerged as a strong pillar of his first year. The groundwork laid for the Bonga Southwest Aparo deepwater project stands out as a defining achievement. By securing presidential approval for fiscal incentives, Ojulari has effectively unlocked the pathway for a potential $20 billion investment. In a global energy landscape where capital is increasingly selective, such positioning matters. It signals to investors that Nigeria is willing to align policy with opportunity, reducing uncertainty and enhancing competitiveness.
Internally, the financial pulse of the company has also strengthened. Within a year, NNPC Limited has reportedly remitted N14.706 trillion in statutory contributions to the federal government and related agencies. This figure is not merely a reflection of earnings; it speaks to improved discipline in revenue management and a renewed commitment to fulfilling the company’s fiscal responsibilities.
Early in his tenure, Ojulari acknowledged the weight of expectations placed upon him. The targets, he admitted, were tough. One year later, that admission reads less like caution and more like context. Out of the core mandates before him, he has made substantial progress on most, while deliberately slowing down on refining to reset the foundation. It is a record that suggests not perfection, but purpose.
As he steps into his second year, the questions will grow sharper. Progress must be sustained, gains must be scaled, and early decisions must translate into lasting transformation. But if the first year has established anything, it is that Ojulari is not inclined toward easy narratives. His approach has been to confront reality, however inconvenient, and to build from there.
In that sense, his first year has not merely been about “walking the talk.” It has been about redefining what the talk should be, and backing it with action.
Ben Ekori, an energy sector expert and public affairs analyst wrote this piece from Lagos.





